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After decades of weak growth, Philippine manufactured exports have performed impressively in
recent years, better than those of most other South East Asian economies. This paper examines the
sources of Philippine export dynamism and asks whether the current pace of growth is
sustainable. It finds that the competitive base is very narrow, dominated by one product group
and, within that, one product (semiconductors). This is a fast growing, high technology product,
with great potential for future growth and spillovers; however, Philippines specialises in low-end
final assembly and testing, where it is vulnerable to competitive entry and technological change.
The paper ends with policy implications.
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A.  Introduction
Philippine manufactured exports have expanded vigorously in recent years. The compound annual
growth rate (in current dollar values) exceeded 21 percent over 1990-97, a massive improvement
over the 9.6 percent rate during the 1980s. More exceptionally, exports have continued to perform
strongly during the crisis, when those of its traditionally more dynamic neighbours have flagged.
While there are some signs of falling off in the rate of growth in the past two months, growth
continues to be at double-digit rates and it may be that the slowdown is a short-term cycle.
Philippines has overtaken its main (and much longer established) competitor in the region,
Malaysia, in semiconductors, its main export product. This export is well positioned in terms of
growth prospects, and is handled entirely by leading global companies, ensuring access to
technology and markets. The particular products made in the Philippines are less susceptible to
price falls than more standard memory chips. This augurs well for its export competitiveness.
Nevertheless, it is not clear how sustainable this export growth is. An overwhelming reliance on
one subset of products, however dynamic and globalized, is risky. In this product, recent export
growth seems to be due mainly to new investments by multinationals; if so, it will slow down once
new capacities have been ‘run in’ and new facilities are built up in other locations. Other exports,
including labour-intensive ones like clothing where the country should have a strong comparative
advantage, are doing badly (and have been even before the crisis). Philippines is not utilizing its
competitive edge in its cheap skilled labour force fully. Even the skill base suffers from problems
of quality and relevance – these will loom larger as industry moves into more complex products. It
suffers from other competitive handicaps, in particular in its infrastructure and the low levels of
capability of domestic firms (which deter greater local content in sophisticated exports).
Technological and design activity is very low, and technical support for domestic firms, in
particular SMEs, is weak. FDI policies lag behind best practice in the region in effectiveness. It is
imperative for the country to diversify its competitive base, deepen its advantage in its main export
activities and strengthen local enterprises. This chapter considers the main policy issues that arise
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B.  Recent Export Performance
B.1 Growth Rates
Philippines is not a large exporter by regional standards. The value of its manufactured exports
was $17.6 billion in 1996, the smallest of its export-oriented neighbours. The main exporters were
China ($130.3 billion), Korea ($111.2 billion), Taiwan ($108.5 billion) and Singapore ($59 billion
of own exports). Its ASEAN neighbours were also much larger exporters: Malaysia $67 billion,
Thailand $43 billion and Indonesia $29 billion. Philippines’ growth was robust over 1990-95, a
vast improvement over the 1980s, but several neighbours did better (from larger bases). From
1996 onwards, however, Philippine exports outpace the others and continue to do so into 1998.
Table 1 shows the growth of merchandise exports for Philippines and its neighbours till late 1998.
In 1996, when a drop in world trade growth caused a sharp deterioration in exports elsewhere,
Philippines raised its growth rate. In 1997, growth accelerated further, with only China recording a
comparable (but lower) rate. In the first 11 months of 1998, Philippine export growth slowed (but
to a healthy 17%). In contrast, rates for all its neighbours turned negative, even in those (e.g. China
and Taiwan) not directly involved in the crisis. The regional slowdown had a progressive impact
on these countries, while Philippines exports revived in the third quarter to 19%. This revival
continued in the fourth quarter of 1998: the annualized export growth for November was 12%,
compared to 9.3% for October. Thus, Philippine exports have escaped the regional ‘contagion’,
Table 1: Annual growth rates of merchandise exports (% pa)
1980-90 1990-95 1996 1997 1998 1998
Jan-Nov 1 quarter 2 quarter 3 quarter
Philippines 4 16 17 24 17 24 15 19
Korea 14 14 4 5 -12 9 -2 -10
Taiwan 13 11 4 5 -9
Singapore 11 18 6 -1 - -7 -9 -8
Malaysia 9 20 5 1 -4 -9 -11 -
Indonesia 2 12 10 7 -6 (a) 1 -8 -
Thailand 14 21 -1 3 -14 (a) -3 -5 -9
China NA 19 2 21 -0.2 13 3 -2
World 7 7 4 3 - -1 -2 (b) -
Sources: UN Comtrade, WTO Annual Report 1998, IMF IFS October 1998, national
statistical offices on the Internet.
Notes: (a) January-September. (b) Exports by industrial countries only; imports by
industrial countries were stagnant in this period.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS49 Page 4
and their performance is matching that of the most dynamic countries before the crisis struck. Its
main export product continues to thrive (below). Its main market, USA (taking 37% of its exports
in January-June 1998) is importing more from Philippines. While total US imports of electrical
machinery (the main manufactured export) fell by 0.6% in January-September 1998, its imports of
machinery and transport equipment from the Philippines rose by 21%.
B.2 Manufactured Export Structure
Manufactured products and have steadily increased their share of the total, now accounting for
over 80 percent of Philippine merchandise exports. In recent years, their growth has accelerated
faster than total exports; the growth rate in 1994-97was over 11 percentage points higher than in
1991-93. Despite a slowdown in the first three quarters of 1998, manufactured exports continue to
rise at over 20% per annum. However, the pattern is highly skewed (Figure 1). Over 1991-97, 84%
of the rise in the value of manufactured exports comes from electronics, with one group of
electronics, semiconductors, accounting for 64% (Table 2). The corresponding figures for the first
9 months of 1998 are 113% and 98%. This pace of growth more than doubles the share of
electronics, from below one-third to over two-thirds; semiconductors alone contribute over half of
the total in 1997 and nearly 60% in January-September 1998. The other major products with
substantial (20% plus) growth over 1991-97 (textiles, machinery and transport equipment)
contribute only 5% of the total in 1997.
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If electronics are excluded, Philippines’ export performance is more modest, and deteriorates from
1996 onwards in reaction to the financial crisis. The growth rate of consumer manufactures falls
from 10% in 1991-3 to negative between 1996 and 1998, due mainly to the poor performance of
garments, Philippines’ main traditional export. However, many other consumer products –
footwear, toys, and leather goods – also do badly. Some fared poorly even before the crisis: the
value of garment exports was virtually stagnant over 1994-97; their growth over (pre-crisis) 1990-
95 was lower than for its ASEAN neighbours and China.
1 Since Philippine wages are lower than
in Malaysia and Thailand (though higher than in Indonesia and China), this suggests a weak
competitive base in this labour-intensive activity. The recent performance of garment exports in
non-quota markets, which face the most intense competition from low-wage countries like China,
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, has been even worse. This reinforces the impression that quality and
technology upgrading in the Philippines is lagging. Other labour-intensive products like footwear,
toys and leather goods also perform poorly, with growth rates of below 3% over 1994-97. The
most important resource-based export, processed foods, shows a generally weak and cyclical
growth performance. The crisis is only partly to blame for this – the causes must lie in the
competitive base of the Philippines.
C.  Structural Competitiveness
C.1 Positive Aspects
Electronics, and within this one product, semiconductors, are the engine of Philippine export
growth. While other countries in the region are longer-established exporters of semiconductors, the
industry has grown much faster in the Philippines.
                                       
1 The annual rate of growth of garment exports from the Philippines in 1990-95 was 7.7%, compared to 11.5% for Malaysia,
12.3% from Thailand, 15.7% from Indonesia and 20.1% from China.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS49 Page 6
Table 3: Evolution of World Manufactured Exports by Technological Categories (1980-96)
Shares (%)
1980 1985 1990 1995 1996
Resource based 19.5 19.3 15.5 14.0 13.7
Low tech 25.3 23.4 23.7 22.0 21.3
Medium tech 38.6 37.3 38.5 36.9 37.2
High tech 16.5 20.1 22.2 27.1 27.7
Rates of Growth (% p.a.)
1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-96 1980-96
Resource based 2.0 10.1 6.4 -0.2 5.7
Low tech 0.7 15.3 6.9 -0.9 6.9
Medium tech 1.6 15.7 7.7 3.0 7.8
High tech 6.3 17.4 13.0 4.5 11.6
Total 2.3 15.0 8.6 2.1 8.1
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade data.
The ‘high technology’ products that dominate Philippine exports comprise the most dynamic
group in trade. Table 3 shows the evolution of world manufactured trade for four technological
categories
2. The long-term trend is clearly for trade to shift from technologically simple to complex
products. Over 1980-96, resource-based exports grew the slowest (5.7%) and high-tech exports the
fastest (11.6%). From being the smallest category in world exports in 1980, high-tech products
surpassed resource-based products by 1985 and low-technology products by 1996. At present rates
of growth, high-technology products will soon be the largest single traded group.
There are many reasons for their rising importance in trade (and production): the rapid
introduction of new high value products, high income elasticity of technology-intensive products
(and related services), and their falling costs because of new processes. Moreover, the presence of
high-tech manufacturing activities tends to generate advanced skills and have beneficial spillover
effects on related activities. A specialization in high-tech products is thus the best ‘positioning’ for
exports.
                                       
2 Resource-based products are mainly processed foods and tobacco, simple wood products, refined petroleum products, dyes,
leather (not leather products), precious stones and organic chemicals. Low technology products are textiles, garments, footwear,
other leather products, toys, simple metal and plastic products, furniture and glassware. Medium technology products are mainly
automotive products, most industrial chemicals and industrial machinery, and simple electrical and electronic products. High
technology products are fine chemicals and pharmaceuticals, complex electrical and electronic machinery, aircraft and precision
instruments. For a more detailed analysis see S. Lall, ‘Exports of manufactures by developing countries: emerging patterns of trade
and location’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 1998, pp. 54-73.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS49 Page 7
Table 4: Technological structure of manufactured exports by country, 1996
(% of each country’s total manufactured exports)
Resource Based Low Technology Medium
Technology
High Technology
Philippines 5.9 19.1 7.2 67.8
Hong Kong 4.4 52.7 14.0 28.9
Singapore 12.7 7.9 14.0 65.4
Korea 9.4 28.4 26.6 35.7
Taiwan 5.1 33.9 20.2 40.9
Indonesia 34.9 41.9 8.5 14.7
Malaysia 17.8 13.1 8.7 60.4
Thailand 14.5 35.6 13.5 36.3
China 9.8 56.3 13.4 20.6
Mexico 7.1 20.9 35.2 36.9
World 13.7 21.3 37.2 27.7
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade and Philippine DTI data.
Table 4 shows the technological structure of Philippine exports in relation to its neighbours (and to
Mexico, the most dynamic exporter to the US since NAFTA). The Philippine structure is now
more ‘high-tech’ than that of Malaysia and Singapore, which are longer-established and larger
exporters of electronics and (like the Philippines) are part of integrated MNC production networks.
It is far more so than countries like Korea and Taiwan, which have considerable indigenous
technological capabilities in these sectors but retain substantial low-technology exports and are
significant exporters of medium-technology engineering goods. Other countries in the region lag
the Philippines in technological sophistication of exports. In fact, the Philippines probably has the
world’s most ‘advanced’ export structure by this measure.
3
                                       
3 The largest exporters, the mature industrial countries where the technologies originate, have more diversified export structures.
For instance, high-tech exports accounted for 28% of total exports for the USA in 1995, 27% in Japan and 25% in the UK. Data
from Appendix Table 6.5, National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 1998, US Government, Washington
DC.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS49 Page 8
Table 5: Philippine Electronics Exports ($ million)






1,767.3 2,674.9 6,060.1 8,468.4 11,495.2 8,193.3 11,416.2
Electrical machinery 42.9 98.1 214.7 206.2 280.8 215.1 351.5
Telecom/sound
apparatus
220.0 369.7 550.4 746.9 831.7 624.6 517.5
Office, data
processing mach.
106.9 215.0 440.9 878.5 2,101.1 1,502.6 1,922.3
Consumer
electronics





86.2 136.6 257.8 270.8 214.8 151.3 208.9
Household
appliances
13.4 19.5 26.8 31.6 34.4 27.9 25.6
Other consumer
products
2.4 4.2 6.2 7.8 3.8 3.6 1.0
Total 2,239.1 3,518.1 7,556.9 10,609.9 14,961.9 10,718.4 14,442.9
Source: Philippines Department of Trade and Industry
Philippines’ specialization within ‘high-tech’ (Table 5) is even more desirable. The product group
in which it falls is the largest and fastest-growing of the fifty most dynamic exports in the world in
1980-95. The value of global exports under this group was $171 billion in 1995 (7% of world
manufactured exports). Its rate of growth over 1980-95 was 18% per annum, compared to 12% for
the 50 dynamic products and 9% for all manufactured exports.
Moreover, the semiconductor products assembled in the Philippines, mainly microprocessors and
specialised chips, are less prone to price fluctuations than standard DRAM chips made by Korea.
For instance, between 1997-98 the price of 64-M DRAM chips fell from $16 to $9 each and of 16-
M DRAM from $3 to $1.8. The breakeven prices for these chips are $14 and $3 respectively.
4
These massive falls were one of the main factors affecting Korean export earnings before the
crisis; the different specialization allowed Philippine exports to continue growing. Moreover,
much of Philippine manufacturing is ‘contract manufacturing’, where wafers are supplied by
foreign customers (including the parent companies of MNCs) to be assembled into individual
chips according to buyers’ specifications. This reduces inventory-holding requirements forQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS49 Page 9
Philippine producers and ensures that capacities are booked well in advance (typically one year).
This arrangement may explain the far better performance by Philippine as compared to Malaysian
exporters of semiconductors (below).
The nature of electronics exporters is another important asset. Practically all exports come from
affiliates of multinationals. In 1996, there were 118 Japanese, 38 Korean, 29 US, 18 Taiwanese
and 11 German subsidiaries in this activity, as well as some smaller foreign companies. All were
producing for export under facilities offered by the Board of Investments or the Philippines Export
Zone Authority. Table 6 shows the leading 50 exporters from the Philippines. The list contains
most major electronics firms in the world. New investment in electronics has grown steadily from
$44 million in 1992 to $1.3 billion in 1995, and has kept growing since. During the first 9 months
of 1998, BOI approvals for electronic and electrical investments rose by 164% over the same
period in 1997. PEZA reports that investments in ecozones rose by 18% in 1998. Among the
leading investors were SMI-ED Philippines Technology Inc. ($150m. semiconductor plant),
Fujitsu (second semiconductor plant for $140 m.), NEC (second semiconductor plant for $137 m.)
and GNF ($61 m. semiconductor plant).
5 While fears have been expressed of a decline in FDI
inflows, the available data do not suggest that these have any strong foundation.
                                                                                                                               
4 Korean Herald, May 28, 1998.
5 Philippines Daily Enquirer, January 7, 1999.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS49 Page 10

































































































Source: Export Development Council, Government of the Philippines
A comparison of semiconductor exports by Philippines and other countries is instructive (Table 7).
However, the data should be treated carefully. Product composition differs between countries:
Korea is specialized in D-RAM chips, while Philippines and Malaysia specialize in
microprocessors. Singapore makes a range of advanced semiconductor devices and is an important
re-exporter for other countries in the region. Taiwan makes application specific chips. The level of
technology and local content involved also differ. Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, China and
Mexico are mainly in the final assembly and testing stages.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS49 Page 11
Table 7: Comparative Exports of Semiconductors ($ m. and %)







1,767.3 2,674.9 3,767.9 8,468.3 11,495.
2
8,193.3 11,416.2





Thailand 1,121.0 1,708.9 2,242.1 2,956.0 3,376.4
China 184.0 359.9 614.4 1,476.9 1,945.7










Taiwan 2,759.7 4,187.5 5,691.8 9,553.1
















2.7% 3.0% 3.1% 4.9% 8.4%
Malaysia 7.2% 8.2% 7.9% 8.0% 10.6%
Thailand 1.7% 1.9% 1.9% 1.7% 2.5%
China 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.8% 1.4%
Singapore 7.0% 7.7% 10.0% 11.3% 14.9%
Korea 10.1% 9.0% 9.8% 9.9%
Taiwan 4.2% 5.6% 4.7% 5.5%
Mexico 0.1% 0.8% 0.8% 1.1% 1.4%
Total
above
29.0% 30.9% 38.5% 43.3% 39.1%
Source: UN Comtrade, national sources.
Malaysia, the nearest direct competitor, has a much longer record of semiconductor exports. Many
of the same MNCs are present there, and over time have made massive investments in physical
facilities, training and technological activity (Intel recently doubled its production capacity in
Penang). Affiliates in Malaysia have been involved in process design and development for new
products. In view of this, it is remarkable that Philippine semiconductor exports exceeded
Malaysian in the first 9 months of 1998, when they were only 40% of Malaysian export values in
1994.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS49 Page 12
It is vital to Philippines’ export prospects to understand if this is a temporary or longer-term
trend. If temporary, Malaysian exports may revive and other production sites may grow more
rapidly: the main engine behind Philippine export growth will then slow or stagnate. If longer-
term, prospects for future growth seem very bright. There are arguments on both sides. On the
pessimistic side, the surge in Philippine exports may be temporary if it only reflects the contracting
of new facilities. Philippines has enjoyed a surge in electronics investments in the past 4-5 years;
once new capacities are fully used, the rate of growth will moderate and over time other sites will
catch up.
On the optimistic side, however, there are reasons for the surge to continue. New FDI is flowing
into the industry. The main competitive strength, its relatively skilled, English-speaking
workforce, is lower cost than in Malaysia. Shopfloor wages are $200-250 per month, compared to
$300-350 in Malaysia. A new graduate engineer is available at $400-500 in the Philippines,
compared to $800-1000 in Malaysia, a production manager at $1000-2000 compared to $3600, a
production supervisor at $500-600 compared to $1300. Moreover, the availability of engineers in
the Philippines is much better than in Malaysia, where companies have to use (expensive)
expatriate technical staff. This is a critical factor in a highly skill-intensive industry. Some MNCs
are using the Philippines for more technology-intensive jobs. Labour turnover rates are lower in
the Philippines than in Malaysia, conducing to greater skill formation in the former. Japanese
investors regard the discipline, trainability and loyalty of Filipino workers very highly; in mission
interviews, some rated the workforce as the ‘best in the world’.
The educational base in the Philippines compares well with many neighboring countries. Table 8
shows general educational enrolments as well as tertiary level enrolments in technical subjects in
the Philippines and other countries. The last column is perhaps the most relevant for high-tech
industries: the numbers of scientists, engineers, mathematicians and computer specialists. Here,
the Philippines scores better than all the other countries in the region except for Korea, Taiwan and
Japan, and is not too far from the advanced industrial countries. Given its long lag in industrial and
export development behind the ‘new Tigers’, it has excellent prospects for promoting export-
oriented manufacturing and services based on its lead in education.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS49 Page 13
C.2 Negative Aspects
Table 8: Educational Enrolments (latest available year)
Enrolment
Ratios



























75 21.9 13,400 0.219% 16,600 0.271% 30,000 0.490%
Singapo
re
62 33.7 1,300 0.039% 1,400 0.042% 13,000 0.391% 15,700 0.472%





















58 10.6 8,800 0.044% 4,600 0.023% 12,700 0.063% 26,100 0.130%
Thailan
d
55 20.1 22,500 0.039% 27,100 0.047% 58,700 0.101% 108,30
0
0.186%
China 69 5.7 167,70
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Memo Item: Some industrialized countries
France 111 49.6 304,10
0












UK 134 48.3 120,70
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USA 97 81.1 496,40
0





Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1997, and national sources for Taiwan, China.
This section highlights some of the main structural weaknesses in the competitive and export
structure of the Philippines. It focuses on human capital and technology, and on the two majorQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS49 Page 14
export activities, clothing and electronics. The most obvious weakness, touched on already, is the
level of concentration of exports: this high dependence on one activity is inherently risky. Any
downturn caused by a slackening of FDI or a technological shift that affects costs in the
Philippines can be disastrous. The very fact that the activity is so technologically dynamic and
globalized in production increases the risk. Skill and technical requirements are changing
constantly. All industrializing countries are trying hard to attract electronics multinationals, and
keeping ahead of the rest is likely to be a very demanding task.
The risk of dependence on semiconductors is exacerbated by the anemic performance of other
products. Exports of labour-intensive consumer products show unexpected competitive
weaknesses, both against higher wage economies like Malaysia and Thailand as well as lower
wage economies like China and those in South Asia. Given the skill base and openness to FDI, it
is not clear why garments and similar products are performing so poorly. As noted, the financial
crisis only provides part of the explanation – there are evidently lags in upgrading of process
technology and product quality. Relative to most of its neighbours, the Philippines still has a
strong underlying advantage in labour-intensive exports, but maintaining this advantage requires
sustained upgrading as cheaper competitors emerge in China, South Asia and Vietnam.
Human Capital
Despite its enrolment record, the Philippine education and training system faces problems of
quality and relevance. There is a 40% dropout or failure rate at universities and colleges. The
school cycle is one year shorter than in most other countries, so that higher education institutions
have to spend more time bringing entrants up to required levels. The curriculum is not geared to
modern technological needs and has little inputs from industry, unlike the NIEs where there is
much more direct and continuous interaction between providers and users of higher education.
Standards in many higher education institutions are below international levels. In an exercise
ranking 105 state and over 1000 private colleges into four categories (the highest level, 4, being
equivalent to a good foreign university), the Commission for Higher Education found in 1996 that
only 2 institutions in the country achieved Level 4. The vast majority clustered in the two lowest
levels. The Commission identified 18 ‘Centres of Excellence’, to be given special assistance to
upgrade faculties and equipment. However, the bulk of the higher education sector is turning out
graduates of variable, rather indifferent, quality.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS49 Page 15
Technical education and training for industry also suffer widespread quality problems. In 1992, the
Educational Commission found the technical training system to be ill managed and under-
financed: it had one of the lowest per capita expenditures in the region (only Bangladesh was
lower). There is a significant of mismatch between the skills provided by the system and those
needed by employers, resulting in large numbers of unemployed trainees. Most large
manufacturing firms, especially foreign affiliates, invest significantly in employee training, but to
date no systematic survey has been made if industrial training. However, without a comprehensive
and continuous monitoring of industrial training, the government cannot systematically encourage
it. There is no government levy to promote employee training; such levies exist in most
neighboring countries, along with other schemes to encourage or subsidize firms to invest in
upgrading employee skills. SMEs invest little or nothing in formal training of their workforce, and
are largely unaware of the need for this: special schemes are needed to upgrade their human
capital.
Technological Activity and Support
There is a striking mismatch in the Philippines between local technological effort and the high-
tech structure of exports. Overall levels of R&D are low, especially that financed by enterprises
(Table 10). The public sector dominates R&D, with poor quality R&D management and
institutions delinked from productive activity. While this is also true of some countries in the
region (e.g. Indonesia and Thailand), it is not typical of the technology-oriented NIEs like
Singapore, Korea and Taiwan.
Such low technological effort may not matter as long as enterprises can remain competitive with
heavy reliance on imported technologies. This is adequate for export activity when only simple
assembly is involved and MNC participation ensures the continuous inflow of new know-how and
components. However, the lack of local technological effort can constrain competitiveness as
wages rise and more complex, value-added activities have to be undertaken. R&D becomes
necessary, not to replace imported technologies, but to use them more effectively and to go back in
the value chain from assembly into design and manufacturing. In Malaysia, electronics MNCs
have gradually raised the technological level of activity and several now use R&D by local
affiliates to design and develop new versions of mature products (mainly in consumer products).
In both Malaysia and Singapore, much of the enterprise-financed expenditure shown in the tableQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS49 Page 16
comes from foreign affiliates. Outside MNCs, R&D capability is increasingly needed to promote
the growth and competitiveness of local suppliers and subcontractors.
Table 10: R&D Employment and Expenditures
R&D Personnel R&D Expenditures







Per m. pop. Numbers R&D % GNP
Philippines 1992 157 9,960 0.20 0.05
Hong Kong 1995 98 574 0.30 0.01
Singapore 1995 2,728 7,695 1.10 0.69
Korea 1994 2,636 117,486 2.80 2.35
Taiwan 1995 3,022 63,457 1.80 0.99
Indonesia 1995 N/A N/A 0.10 0.08
Malaysia 1992 87 1,633 0.40 0.17
Thailand 1995 119 6,899 0.10 0.01
China 1995 350 422,700 0.50 ...
Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1997 and national sources for Taiwan (China).
A weak technological support structure, manifested in low public R&D, reduces the ability of
smaller enterprises to innovate and raise productivity. This is why the NIEs invested heavily in
promoting R&D, both in public institutions and, more importantly, in private industrial
enterprises, while encouraging the import of new technology from advanced countries.
6 Singapore,
a highly MNC-based economy, targeted MNCs for particular activities (most recently, into R&D
itself) and induced existing investors to upgrade their technological levels over time. It provided
comprehensive technical and financial support for local SMEs, an essential means of enabling
them to subcontract to MNCs and so benefit from technological spillovers. Korea had the most
comprehensive and ambitious policies for technology development, combining high technology
import with a strategy of developing local capabilities. This involved promoting the chaebol to
spearhead investment and technology development; the top few chaebol now account for over
three-quarters of total private R&D in the country. Taiwan also mounted a broad array of
technology support measures aimed largely at its SMEs, with public provision of technological
support and a very pro-active system of extension and contract research.
                                       
6 See Sanjaya Lall, Learning from the Asian Tigers, London: Macmillan, 1996.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS49 Page 17
The Philippine government has neglected private R&D. Its trade and industrial regimes have failed
to foster an autonomous technology culture, and its SME support system is weak. Despite its
ambitious Science and Technology Agenda for National Development (STAND), much of the
effort remains on paper. Technology finance is weak and there is little effort to raise an awareness
of the need for technological effort among private enterprises. The Department of Science and
Technology system is large. It encompasses the National Academy of Science and Technology and
the National Research Council, as well as five research Councils. It also contains 7 research
institutes — for industrial technology; metal industry; nuclear power; textiles; advanced science
and technology; food and nutrition; and forest products — and 6 other institutes, for science
education, technology information, technology application and promotion, atmospheric geophysics
and astronomy, seismology and a science high school.
However, its practical relevance for industrial technology development is limited. Only 2 percent
of DOST staff in 1995 have doctorates, and another 9 percent masters’ level qualifications. Staff is
poorly compensated and tends to be out of touch with international scientific trends and research
being done by counterparts overseas. 7 There has been relatively little direct interaction with, or
contract research from, the private industrial sector (the whole system had 23 contract research
projects from private industry in 1995). Few of the technologies created are in commercial
production. R&D into designated ‘export winners’ has yet to yield tangible benefits, and its focus
does not seem directly relevant to areas of dynamic competitive advantage to the Philippines.
8
DOST also provides a number of industrial testing and laboratory services; these account for most
of its budget and employment.
The Bureau of Product Standards provides testing facilities, promotes quality standards, and
accredits independent laboratories. It has been promoting the spread of ISO 9000 standards in the
Philippines, but cannot offer any incentives to firms to adopt these standards. This may hold back
the spread of an important competitive tool among smaller local enterprises in the country (many
countries offer subsidized consultancy services to firms seeking ISO certification). The Bureau has
no financial autonomy and government scales dictate its salaries. This makes it difficult to recruit
                                       
7 Jose A. Magpantay, ‘Streamlining the Science and Technology Sector for the Country’s Development Goals’, Report to the
Department of Budget and Management, Philippines Institute of Development Studies, 1993.
8 The major activities under the ‘export winners’ scheme include glass from processed ‘lahar’, low-sugar mango product, bamboo
products, human identification systems, waxing technology, para-rubber, stripping machinery and calcinated marble dust. Page 3 of
the DOST 1995 Annual Report.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS49 Page 18
and retain good technical graduates. Its equipment limits its testing facilities, and many exporters,
in particular smaller companies that cannot afford in-house facilities, have to use expensive tests
abroad.
In general, therefore, the technology system in the Philippines is of limited effectiveness. There
are too many institutions with different programs and objectives, a major source of weakness. The
management and funding system does not conduce to effective operation or to close linkages with
industry. To quote, “Most institutions involved are significantly under-funded for the scale of tasks
to be accomplished. Many companies complained of the difficulty and delays involved in
obtaining basic services such as equipment calibration … Most institutions appeared to be taking a
passive role in working with firms rather than proactively seeking opportunities to initiate
upgrading programs. There also appears to be a serious difficulty on the part of the institutions in
retaining skilled people because wages are too low.”
9 Government programs to help SME
technology suffer from similar problems: they are “too unorganized, weakly motivated, and under-
funded, and have too many different objectives.”
10 The financing of SME technology upgrading is
a serious problem; technology finance for all sizes of enterprises is still in its infancy. The
technology information system is not very helpful to private firms who need to locate and buy new
technologies from abroad.
Garments
Philippines has no comparative advantage in low-wage garment exports. Its labour costs now are
considerably higher than China or South Asian exporters (Figure 2), though they are still below
those in ASEAN competitors like Malaysia and Thailand. The cost of semi-skilled labour is most
important at the low quality, mass-produced end of the garment industry; as wages rise they have
to be offset by improvements in quality, productivity and flexibility. Philippine wages are lower
than in Malaysia and Thailand, but these countries have expanded their garment exports faster.
China has about the same hourly wages as India and Pakistan but its exports have grown over
twice as fast. Latin American exporters have considerably higher wages but their competitive
position has been transformed by the entry of US producers and their privileged access to the US
                                       
9 Foreign Investment Advisory Service, The Philippines: Promoting Backward Linkages: A Pilot Program for the Electrical
Appliance and Electronics Industry, World Bank, 1995, p. 16.
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market. Italy remains one of the world’s leading clothing exporters despite very high wages ($14
per hour in 1996). Other factors explain the evolution of competitiveness in this industry.
Market access, the operations of multinational producers, and the allocation of quotas under the
MFA are significant influences on the pattern of garment exports. In Asia, the export thrust has
come mainly from local (and regional) firms, while in Latin America foreign (particularly US)
affiliates have been predominant. The MFA has long dictated the location of garment exports, and
has sheltered many quota holders from the full force of competition. Its abolition by 2005 will lead
to a massive ‘shake-out’ in all exporting countries. The OECD market has been moving to higher
quality products, where the cost of labour per se counts for less. Wages will remain the
overwhelming consideration for the slowly diminishing segment of the lowest quality products. In
others, technology, specialization, design, marketing and flexibility will be the dominant
competitive factors. The future of Philippine clothing exports will depend on quality upgrading.
This will depend in turn on the use of new technologies, better access to the best fabrics and other
inputs (a strong domestic textile, dyes and accessories industry), advanced technical, management,
design and marketing skills, and timely delivery and flexibility. High degrees of vertical
Figure 2: Hourly Labour Costs in Apparel (US $) 





















1995QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS49 Page 20
integration, needed in the past to ensure reliable quality and delivery, will be less of an advantage:
higher quality products tend to require smaller firms and greater inter-firm specialization and
subcontracting.
The garment industry has reasonable human capital, especially in fine embroidery (important for
infant wear and certain dresses where the Philippines has a leading position in US markets).
However, it is weak in several specialized technical skills (pattern making, draping and design).
Worker productivity is variable, but there have been few attempts to raise productivity by
benchmarking. Small producers are the furthest behind world ‘best practice’, but several large
producers have also not introduced appropriate process and quality management techniques. As far
as equipment is concerned, investments and FDI in the industry have fallen behind those in other
industries. Imports of textile machinery grew at 6% per annum during 1990-95 as compare to the
growth of total machinery imports of 23% (and of electrical machinery by 24%) per annum.
Investment in clothing fell from 6% of total investment in the Philippines in 1987 to 0.09% by
1995; foreign investments in the industry fell from 7% (of total foreign investments) to 0.11%
over this period.
11 Some large exporters have invested in CAD/CAM equipment, containerization
of shipments and advanced process systems, and so improved their quality and turnaround times.
However, the bulk of the industry remains uncompetitive by best practice standards.
Design capabilities in the Philippines clothing industry, while growing, remain weak. Existing
design schools are inadequate and firms often hire expensive foreign designers. Design
weaknesses hold back quality upgrading, since producers are unable to offer buyers their own
collections and find it more difficult to ‘shop around’ for different, more rewarding, markets.
Delivery times by Philippine exporters are variable: good firms can deliver products to the EC in
30-40 days, but most need 60 days for repeat orders. While this is better than the regional average
(for South Asia, China, Indonesia or Thailand) of 90 days, it does not match East Europe or
Turkey’s 21-40 days, or West Europe’s 14-28 days. In terms of quality as shown by average unit
price, Philippine garments fetch lower prices than those from Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, India,
China, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico or Turkey. The industry suffers from weaknesses in the
upstream local textile industry, which has poor dyeing and finishing capabilities. This forces
garment producers to rely heavily upon imports, often adding to their lead times. Moreover, there
                                       
11 M. S. Austria, The Effects of the MFA Phase Out on the Philippine Garments and Textiles Industries, Philippine Institute for
Development Studies, Manila, 1996, Discussion Paper Series No. 96-07.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS49 Page 21
has been a decline of textile production, possibly weakening the downstream industry: a
restructuring and upgrading of the textile industry would greatly help the competitive position of
clothing exporters. The recent growth in textile exports is encouraging, though these may be from
plants that do not serve local garment producers.
Subcontracting is widely used in the Philippines. It involves large firms ‘putting out’ the assembly
of garments to small assemblers rather than the specialized, integrated fashion production
characteristic of advanced producers (as in the ‘industrial districts’ of North Italy). Filipino
subcontractors tend to remain in low-skill, low value activities and there is a risk that they will
suffer as the MFA goes and competition intensifies. These firms find the greatest difficulty in
finding the financial, human and technological resources to improve their technology. It is
important to strengthen their competitive base at all levels: improving training facilities for
operatives; creating and improving training facilities for garment design, pattern making, draping
and other advanced skills; benchmarking technical efficiency; assisting firms with productivity-
raising measures and in-house training; improving the competitive position of the upstream textile
industry; and encouraging the formation of specialized ‘clusters’ where firms share facilities,
information, technology and skills.
Electronics
The main weaknesses in electronics arise from the low technological and local content levels in
the Philippines. Much of the activity in MNC affiliates is still at the simple assembly and testing
level (despite the fact that some MNCs use local engineers for advanced activities). This may not
constrain exports for the time being, but the capabilities developed for low level assembly may not
automatically grow into those needed for more advanced products and processes. Yet these
advanced technologies will be increasingly needed if growth are to be sustained in the future.
Semiconductor technologies are subject to rapid change, and without a flexible and advanced base
the Philippines may not be able to compete with lower cost competitors. There is also the
possibility that new technologies will not be sensitive to labour costs, but seek locations that offer
advanced production, design and supply capabilities despite higher wages.
Low local value added in the Philippines is another reflection of its weak technological
capabilities. Average local content is only 20% in semiconductors. It is higher, 25%, in simple
items like printed circuit boards and lower, 10-15%, in complex products like microprocessors
(made by companies like Intel), below the average levels reached in Malaysia (around 45%) andQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS49 Page 22
Taiwan (75%). However, a rough indicator of local content (exports divided by imports) suggests
that it has been growing over time (Table 5.9). However, this is a very rough indicator – it is
possible that many exports and imports are unrelated to each other. It is widely acknowledged that
local supplier capabilities (especially among SMEs) are weak; they need to be strengthened if local
content is to keep rising. There are practically no local producers with the capability to take on
‘original equipment manufacture’ (OEM), which was one of the main arrangements used by firms
in Korea and Taiwan to access new technologies and export advanced electronics products.
D.  Policy Implications
The most important immediate issue facing the Philippines in the competitiveness area is clearly
the sustainability of the electronics export boom. However, there are other important, longer-term,
strategic issues related to export competitiveness: the overwhelming dependence on one activity is
risky, labour-intensive exports show disturbing signs of declining competitiveness, and
institutional support for the upgrading of enterprise capabilities remains inadequate.
It is not possible to give an unequivocal answer to the issue of electronics export
sustainability. The critical factor is the international sourcing pattern of leading US and Japanese
multinationals, and these are based on economic as well as other factors (including corporate
Table 9: Exports as % of Imports in Philippine Electronics Industry
Products 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average
Semi-conductor
devices
106.0 105.0 108.5 104.1 124.2 131.6 117.9
Electrical machinery 11.0 11.3 13.5 20.1 21.5 14.8 16.2
Telecom/sound
apparatus
70.9 71.3 67.1 58.6 48.5 48.7 55.8
Office, data
processing mach.
77.9 54.9 85.5 75.0 89.1 105.7 86.9
Consumer electronics 251.9 290.8 232.0 214.3 163.3 177.6 200.3
Audio visual
products
319.3 367.2 309.0 263.4 205.3 261.9 262.2
Household
appliances
112.6 171.8 92.0 90.7 57.8 48.5 76.1
Other consumer
products
150.0 48.5 113.5 151.4 101.6 130.0 113.6
Total 87.6 82.8 86.6 85.9 98.3 102.3 93.7
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strategies). It is not immediately obvious why there has been a regional shift in sourcing of
semiconductors towards the Philippines from traditional centers like Malaysia. The main economic
advantage of the Philippines appears to lie in its relatively cheap and plentiful technical labour, but
it has to be established whether this is the driving force behind recent FDI and sourcing patterns. If
it is, the Philippine advantage is a genuine one in comparison with the other ‘new Tigers’ and all
efforts should be made to maintain and improve it. If it is not, and the sourcing simply reflects the
timing of new investments, the boom may fade in a year or two as new plants are ‘run in’.
It is imperative for the Philippines to strengthen its competitiveness in other activities. Not
only is it necessary to diversify the export base (and so reduce the risk inherent in the present level
of product concentration), it is inappropriate for labour-intensive exports to lose their international
edge at this stage of development. To revive their competitiveness, the Philippines needs to
formulate and implement strategies aimed specifically at skill, technology and marketing
weaknesses in a range of manufacturing activities. The government appears fully aware of these
needs, and has mounted a comprehensive response – unfortunately, much of this remains on paper.
There are widespread institutional weaknesses in the major support institutions that need to be
tackled, backed by efforts to benchmark and raise enterprise level productivity.
While the Philippines’ most valuable resource is human capital, it needs sweeping
improvements at all stages of the education and training system. The quality, relevance, and
completion rates need to be raised, the length of schooling brought into line with international
norms, and access among the poorer sections of the population improved. The quality of higher
education institutions is highly variable and there are few centers of excellence by international
standards: a broad improvement of teaching standards and equipment is needed to create the high
level technical and management skills that competitiveness will require. The technical training
system needs better funding and has to reorient its curricula to employer needs. The specific skills
needed by traditional industries (garments) as well as new ones (electronics) are not being properly
met. Employee training by firms is undertaken mainly by large firms, but smaller firms invest little
in upgrading skills of workers. There are no studies of how much training is being provided and by
whom, so appropriate policy cannot be undertaken.
The technology support system has all the necessary elements on paper, but lacks
implementation and coherence. There is no systematic analysis of the technological needs of the
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invests little in technology development, and there is no program to stimulate technological
activity in industry. There is a need for a ‘technology foresight’ exercise of the type being
undertaken in most OECD countries to involve industry, technology institutions and academia in
evaluating the most pressing technological needs facing the Philippines. This would involve all
concerned sections of the population in understanding the implications of technological change
and gearing up to meet evolving needs effectively.
The technology infrastructure is unable to provide effective support to private industry. Its
salary structures and management are not conducive to seeking out and helping enterprises with
technical problems and upgrading. There is too much attention to routine testing and laboratory
services, which could be in the private sector, and not enough to providing real public goods like
basic or contract research, information collection and dissemination, and extension services to
SMEs. The large number of institutions need to be rationalized and better structured and funded. A
thorough analysis needs to be carried out of DOST’s functions, structure and management, and
measures undertaken to link it more tightly to the productive structure. More generally, there is a
need for launching consultancy and productivity raising measures for industry, using
benchmarking techniques and drawing upon the experience of countries like Taiwan that cater to
large numbers of export-oriented SMEs.
Finally, the specific needs of the major export industries have to be addressed. The electronics
industry is growing rapidly but not deepening sufficiently. The garment industry is falling behind
relative to both higher and lower wage competitors, and needs to upgrade its product range and
quality. Strategies for restructuring and upgrading may be needed for these and other important
activities. These are not being devised adequately by the EDC but there is no other institution
present charged with this function. Industry associations themselves do not conduct the kind of
analytical work needed to influence policies on competitiveness: the government needs to catalyze
such work.